Homomorphic Trapdoor Commitments to Group Elements

Jens Groth

University College London
j.groth@ucl.ac.uk

Abstract

We present homomorphic trapdoor commitments to group elements. In contrast, previous homomorphic trapdoor commitment schemes only allow the messages to be exponents. Our commitment schemes are length-reducing, we can make a short commitment to many group elements at once, and they are perfectly hiding and computationally binding.

The commitment schemes are based on groups with a bilinear map. We can commit to elements from a base group, whereas the commitments belong to the target group. We present two constructions based on simple computational intractability assumptions, which we call respectively the double pairing assumption and the simultaneous triple pairing assumption. While the assumptions are new, we demonstrate that they are implied by well-known assumptions; respectively the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption and the decision linear assumption.

Keywords: Homomorphic trapdoor commitment, bilinear groups, double pairing assumption, simultaneous triple pairing assumption.

1 Introduction

A non-interactive commitment scheme makes it possible to create a *commitment* c to a secret message m. The commitment *hides* the message, but we may later disclose m and demonstrate that c was a commitment to m by revealing the randomness r used when creating it. Revealing the message and the randomness is called *opening* the commitment. It is essential that once a commitment is made, it is *binding*. Binding means that it is infeasible to find two openings of the same commitment to two different messages.

In this paper, we are interested in public-key commitments with some useful features. First, we want the commitment scheme to have a *trapdoor* property. In normal operation the commitment scheme is binding, however, if we know a secret trapdoor tk associated with the public commitment key ck, then it is possible to create commitments that can be opened to any message. We note that the trapdoor property implies that the commitment hides the message. Second, we want the commitment scheme to be *homomorphic*. Homomorphic means that messages and commitments belong to abelian groups and if we multiply two commitments, we get a new commitment that contains the product of the two messages. Third, we want to commitment scheme to be length reducing, *i.e.* the commitment is shorter than the message.

Related work. There are many examples of homomorphic commitments. Homomorphic cryptosystems such as ElGamal [ElG85], Okamoto-Uchiyama [OU98], Paillier [Pai99], BGN [BGN05] or Linear Encryption [BBS04] can be seen as homomorphic commitment schemes that are perfectly binding and computationally hiding. Commitments based on homomorphic encryption can be converted into computationally binding and perfectly hiding homomorphic commitments, see for

instance the mixed commitments of Damgård and Nielsen [DN02] and the commitment schemes used by Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06], Boyen and Waters [BW06], Groth [Gro06] and Groth and Sahai [GS08]. Even for the perfectly hiding variation of these commitment schemes, the size of a commitment is larger than the size of a message though. This length-increase follows from the fact that the underlying building block is a cryptosystem and a ciphertext must be large enough to accommodate the message.

There are also direct constructions of homomorphic trapdoor commitment schemes such as Guillou and Quisquater commitments [GQ88] and Pedersen commitments [Ped91]. Pedersen commitments are one of the most used commitment schemes in the field of cryptography. The public key consists of two group elements g, h belonging to a group of prime order q and we commit to a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ by computing $c = g^m h^t$, where $t \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is a randomly chosen randomizer. Pedersen commitments are perfectly hiding with a trapdoor and if the discrete logarithm problem is hard they are computationally binding. There are many variants of the Pedersen commitment scheme. Fujisaki and Okamoto [FO97] and Damgård and Fujisaki [DF02] for instance suggest a variant where the messages can be arbitrary integers.

There is an important generalization of the Pedersen commitment scheme that makes it possible to commit to many messages at once. The public key consists of $m+1$ group elements $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m, h$ and we compute a commitment to $(m_1, \ldots, m_m)$ as $c = h^t \prod_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_i^{m_i}$. This commitment scheme is length-reducing since we only use one group element to commit to m messages, a feature that has been found useful in contexts such as mix-nets/voting, digital credentials, blind signatures and zero-knowledge proofs [FS01, Nef01, Bra00, KZ06, Lip03].

Common for all the homomorphic trapdoor commitment schemes[1] we mentioned above is that they are homomorphic with respect to *addition* in a ring or a field. However, in public-key cryptography it is common to work over groups that are not rings or fields and often it is useful to commit to group elements from such groups. Of course, if we know the discrete logarithms of the group elements we want to commit to, we can use the Pedersen commitment scheme to commit to the discrete logarithms. In general, we cannot expect to know the discrete logarithms of the group elements that we want to commit to though, leaving us with the open problem of constructing homomorphic trapdoor commitments to group elements.

Our contribution. The contribution of this paper is the construction of homomorphic trapdoor commitment schemes for group elements. The commitment schemes are perfectly hiding, perfectly trapdoor and computationally binding. We stress that we can commit to arbitrary group elements and trapdoor-open to arbitrary group elements, even if we do not know the discrete logarithms of these group elements. Moreover, the commitment schemes have the additional advantage of being length-reducing, we can commit to multiple group elements with one short commitment.

Our constructions are based on bilinear groups. These are groups G_1, G_2, G_T with a bilinear map $e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$. Messages and randomizers will be elements from G_2, whereas the commitments will consist of a few group elements in G_T. An advantage of our commitment schemes is that the constructions are very simple. In one construction, the public key consists of $n+1$ group elements $(g_r, g_1, \ldots, g_n)$ from G_1 and we commit to $m_1, \ldots, m_n \in G_2$ by choosing $r \in G_2$ at random and computing the commitment

$$c = e(g_r, r) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i).$$

[1] Boyen and Waters [BW06], Groth [Gro06] and Groth and Sahai [GS08] use homomorphic commitments to group elements, but do they do not have a *trapdoor* property that makes it possible to open them to arbitrary group elements. Moreover, those commitments suffer from being length-increasing.

In the other construction, the public key consists of $2n + 4$ group elements $(g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_1, h_1, \ldots, g_n, h_n)$ from G_1 and the commitment consists of picking r, s at random from G_2 and computing the commitment (c, d) as

$$c = e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s)\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i) \quad \text{and} \quad d = e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s)\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, m_i).$$

The commitment schemes are computationally binding assuming the double pairing assumption respectively the simultaneous triple pairing assumption hold. The double pairing assumption says that given a random couple (g_r, g_t) from G_1 it is computationally infeasible to find non-trivial group elements $r, t \in G_2$ so

$$e(g_r, r)e(g_t, t) = 1.$$

The simultaneous triple pairing assumption says that given two random triples (g_r, g_s, g_t) and (h_r, h_s, h_t) from G_1 it is computationally infeasible to find non-trivial group elements $r, s, t \in G_2$ so

$$e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s)e(g_t, t) = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s)e(h_t, t) = 1.$$

We will show that the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in G_1 implies the double pairing assumption and perhaps surprisingly that the decision linear assumption [BBS04] in G_1 implies the simultaneous triple pairing assumption.

Applications. As an example of the usage of our commitment schemes, we consider in Section 5 the case of committing to Pedersen commitments. Pedersen commitments, allow the commitment to multiple values $m_1, \ldots, m_m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ as $h^t \prod_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_i^{m_i}$. A Pedersen commitment is itself just a group element, and we can therefore use our commitment schemes to commit to multiple Pedersen commitments. Since our commitment schemes are homomorphic and the Pedersen commitment scheme is homomorphic, their combination is also homomorphic. We get a homomorphic trapdoor commitment scheme to mn elements from $\mathbb{Z}_p$. In contrast with the Pedersen commitment scheme, however, the public key of our scheme is only $O(m + n)$ group elements and it turns out that there are honest verifier zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge of the committed values with complexity $O(m + n)$ field elements.

Such an efficient homomorphic trapdoor commitment scheme may in turn be a useful component in constructing more advanced zero-knowledge arguments. One can for instance reduce the communication complexity of Groth's [Gro09] sub-linear size zero-knowledge argument for circuit satisfiability from $|C|^{\frac{1}{2}}$ group elements to $|C|^{\frac{1}{3}}$ group elements, although the details of the construction are beyond the scope of this paper.

2 Definitions

Notation. Algorithms in our commitment schemes take a security parameter k as input written in unary. For simplicity we will sometimes omit writing the security parameter explicitly, assuming k can be deduced from the other inputs. All our algorithms will be probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. We write $y = A(x; r)$, when A on input x and randomness r outputs y. We write $y \leftarrow A(x)$, for the process of picking randomness r at random and setting $y = A(x; r)$. We also write $y \leftarrow S$ for sampling y uniformly at random from the set S. When defining security, we assume that there is an adversary attacking our schemes. The adversary is modeled as a non-uniform polynomial time stateful algorithm. By stateful, we mean that we do not need to give it the same input twice, it remembers from the last invocation what its state was. This makes the notation a little simpler, since we do not need to explicitly write out the transfer of state from one

invocation to the next. Given two functions $f, g : \mathbb{N} \to [0; 1]$ we write $f(k) \approx g(k)$ when there is negligible difference, *i.e.*, $|f(k) - g(k)| = k^{-\omega(1)}$.

2.1 Commitments

A commitment scheme is a protocol between Alice and Bob that allows Alice to commit to a secret message m. Later Alice may open the commitment and reveal to Bob that she committed to m. Commitment schemes must be binding and hiding. Binding means that Alice cannot change her mind, a commitment can only be opened to one message m. Hiding means that Bob does not learn which message Alice committed to.

In this paper, we will focus on non-interactive commitment schemes. In a non-interactive commitment scheme, Alice computes the commitment herself and sends it to Bob. The opening process is also non-interactive, it simply consists of Alice sending the message and the randomness she used when creating the commitment to Bob. Bob can now run the commitment protocol himself to check that indeed this was the message Alice had committed to.

A non-interactive commitment scheme consists of three polynomial time algorithms $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com})$. $\mathcal{G}$ is a probabilistic setup algorithm that takes as input the security parameter k and outputs some setup information gk. The setup information gk can for instance describe a finite group over which we are working, but it could also just be the security parameter written in unary so there is no loss of generality in including a setup algorithm. We include an explicit algorithm for the setup because when designing cryptographic protocols we often need the commitment scheme to work with an existing finite group. K is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the setup gk and generates a commitment key ck and a trapdoor key tk. The commitment key ck specifies a message space $\mathcal{M}_{ck}$, a randomizer space $\mathcal{R}_{ck}$ and a commitment space $\mathcal{C}_{ck}$. We assume it is easy to verify membership of the message space, randomizer space and the commitment space and it is possible to sample randomizers uniformly at random from $\mathcal{R}_{ck}$. The algorithm com takes as input the commitment key ck, a message m from the message space, a randomizer r from the randomizer space and outputs a commitment c in the commitment space.

We are interested in constructing homomorphic trapdoor commitments. By homomorphic, we mean that $\mathcal{M}_{ck}, \mathcal{R}_{ck}, \mathcal{C}_{ck}$ are groups with the property that if we multiply two commitments, then we get a commitment to the product of the messages. By trapdoor we mean that given the secret trapdoor key generated by the key generator, it is possible to open a commitment to any message. For this purpose, we have two additional probabilistic polynomial time algorithms Tcom and Topen. Tcom takes the trapdoor tk as input and outputs an equivocal commitment c and an equivocation key ek. Topen on input ek, c and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}_{ck}$ creates an opening $r \in \mathcal{R}_{ck}$ of the commitment, so $c = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(m; r)$.

Definition 1 (Homomorphic trapdoor commitment scheme) *A homomorphic trapdoor commitment scheme consists of a quintuple of algorithms* $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com}, \mathrm{Tcom}, \mathrm{Topen})$ *as described above, such that* $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com})$ *is hiding and binding and homomorphic and* $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com}, \mathrm{Tcom}, \mathrm{Topen})$ *has a perfect trapdoor property as defined below.*

Definition 2 (Perfect hiding) *The triple* $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com})$ *is perfectly hiding if for all stateful adversaries* $\mathcal{A}$ *we have*

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr\left[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); (ck, tk) \leftarrow K(gk); (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, ck); c \leftarrow \mathrm{com}_{ck}(m_0) : \mathcal{A}(c) = 1\right] \\ = \; & \Pr\left[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); (ck, tk) \leftarrow K(gk); (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, ck); c \leftarrow \mathrm{com}_{ck}(m_1) : \mathcal{A}(c) = 1\right], \end{aligned}$$

where we require that $\mathcal{A}$ *outputs* m_0, m_1 *that belong to* $\mathcal{M}_{ck}$.

Definition 3 (Computational binding) *The triple* $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com})$ *is computationally binding if for all non-uniform polynomial time stateful adversaries* $\mathcal{A}$ *we have*

$$\Pr\Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); (ck, tk) \leftarrow K(gk); (m_0, m_1, r_0, r_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, ck) : \\ m_0 \neq m_1 \quad \wedge \quad \mathrm{com}_{ck}(m_0; r_0) = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(m_1; r_1)\Big] \approx 0,$$

where we require that $\mathcal{A}$ *outputs* $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_{ck}$ *and* $r_0, r_1 \in \mathcal{R}_{ck}$.

Definition 4 (Perfect trapdoor) *The quintuple* $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com}, \mathrm{Tcom}, \mathrm{Topen})$ *is perfectly trapdoor if for all stateful adversaries* $\mathcal{A}$ *we have*

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr\Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); (ck, tk) \leftarrow K(gk); m \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, ck); r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{ck}; c = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(m; r) : \mathcal{A}(c, r) = 1\Big] \\ = \; & \Pr\Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); (ck, tk) \leftarrow K(gk); m \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, ck); (c, ek) \leftarrow \mathrm{Tcom}_{ck}(tk); \\ & \qquad r \leftarrow \mathrm{Topen}_{ek}(c, m) : \mathcal{A}(c, r) = 1\Big], \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathcal{A}$ *outputs* $m \in \mathcal{M}_{ck}$.

We note that the perfect trapdoor property implies that the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, since a commitment is perfectly indistinguishable from an equivocal commitment that can be opened to any message.

Definition 5 (Homomorphic) *The commitment scheme* $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com})$ *is homomorphic if* K *always outputs* ck *describing groups* $\mathcal{M}_{ck}, \mathcal{R}_{ck}, \mathcal{C}_{ck}$*, which we will write multiplicatively, such that for all* $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}_{ck}, r, r' \in \mathcal{C}_{ck}$ *we have*

$$\mathrm{com}_{ck}(m; r)\mathrm{com}_{ck}(m; r') = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(mm'; rr').$$

3 Foundation

Bilinear groups. Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that generates $(p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k)$ such that

- p is a k-bit prime
- G_1, G_2, G_T are cyclic groups of order p
- $e : G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T$ is a non-degenerate bilinear map so
  - $e(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)$ generates G_T if γ_1, γ_2 generate G_1 and G_2
  - $\forall \gamma_1 \in G_1, \gamma_2 \in G_2, a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ we have $e(\gamma_1^a, \gamma_2^b) = e(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)^{ab}$
- Group operations, evaluation of the bilinear map, sampling of generators and membership of G_1, G_2, G_T are all efficiently computable.

Double pairing assumption. The security of our first commitment scheme will be based on the double pairing assumption. The double pairing problem is given random elements $g_r, g_t \in G_1$ to find a non-trivial couple $(r, t) \in G_2^2$ such that $e(g_r, r)e(g_t, t) = 1$.

Definition 6 *We say the double pairing assumption holds for the bilinear group generator $\mathcal{G}$ if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have*

$$\Pr\Big[gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); g_r, g_t \leftarrow G_1; (r,t) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, g_r, g_t) : \\ (r,t) \in G_2^2 \setminus \{(1,1)\} \quad \wedge \quad e(g_r, r)e(g_t, t) = 1\Big] \approx 0.$$

We remark that the double pairing assumption can only hold when there is no non-trivial efficiently computable homomorphism $\psi : G_1 \to G_2$, since otherwise choosing $r = \psi(g_t)$ and $t = \psi(g_r)$ would break the assumption.

Simultaneous triple pairing assumption. The security of our second commitment scheme will be based on the simultaneous triple pairing assumption. The simultaneous triple pairing problem is given random elements $g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_t, h_t \in G_1$ to find a non-trivial triple $(r, s, t) \in G_2^3$ such that $e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s)e(g_t, t) = 1$ and $e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s)e(h_t, t) = 1$.

Definition 7 (Simultaneous triple pairing assumption) *We say the simultaneous triple pairing assumption holds for the bilinear group generator $\mathcal{G}$ if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have*

$$\Pr\Big[gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_t, h_t \leftarrow G_1; \\ (r,s,t) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_t, h_t) : (r,s,t) \in G_2^3 \setminus \{(1,1,1)\} \\ \wedge \quad e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s)e(g_t, t) = 1 \quad \wedge \quad e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s)e(h_t, t) = 1\Big] \approx 0.$$

Unlike the double pairing assumption, the simultaneous triple pairing assumption may hold even if there is an efficiently computable homomorphism $\psi : G_1 \to G_2$, and for that matter even if $G_1 = G_2$.

3.1 Security Analysis of the Double Pairing Assumption

The double pairing assumption is a new assumption. To gain confidence in the double pairing assumption, we will now show that it is implied by the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in G_1.

Definition 8 (Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption) *The decision Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G_1 for $\mathcal{G}$ if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have*

$$\Pr\Big[gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \ ; \ g_r, g_t \leftarrow G_1; \ \rho \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \ : \mathcal{A}(gk, g_r, g_s, g_r^\rho, g_t^\rho) = 1\Big] \\ \approx \quad \Pr\Big[gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \ ; \ g_r, g_t \leftarrow G_1; \ \rho, \tau \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \ : \mathcal{A}(gk, g_r, g_t, g_r^\rho, g_t^\tau) = 1\Big].$$

Theorem 9 *If the decision Diffie-Hellman holds in G_1 for $\mathcal{G}$, then the double pairing holds for $\mathcal{G}$.*

Proof. We will show that an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that breaks the double pairing assumption with probability $\epsilon(k)$ can be used to build a decision Diffie-Hellman adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that has advantage $\epsilon(k) - 3/p$ in breaking the decision Diffie-Hellman problem. Given a Diffie-Hellman challenge $(gk, g_r, g_t, g_r^\rho, g_t^\tau)$, where τ may be random or may be equal to ρ, $\mathcal{B}$ gives the challenge (gk, g_r, g_t) to $\mathcal{A}$. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a pair (r, t) in response. $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1 if (r, t) is a non-trivial pair so $e(g_r, r)e(g_t, t) = 1$ and $e(g_r^\rho, r)e(g_t^\tau, t) = 1$, otherwise $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 0.

Let us look at the first distribution $(gk, g_r, g_t, g_r^\rho, g_t^\rho)$. There is $\epsilon(k)$ chance for $\mathcal{A}$ outputting a non-trivial pair so $e(g_r, r)e(g_t, t) = 1$, in which case we will also have $e(g_r^\rho, r)e(g_t^\rho, t) = 1$. So here $\mathcal{B}$ has probability $\epsilon(k)$ of outputting 1.

Let us now look at the second distribution $(gk, g_r, g_t, g_r^\rho, g_t^\tau)$. There is less than $3/p$ chance of $g_r = 1, g_t = 1$ or $\rho = \tau$. In case $g_r \neq 1, g_t \neq 1$ and $\rho \neq \tau$, there is no non-trivial couple r, t such that $e(g_r, r)e(g_t, t) = 1$ and $e(g_r^\rho, r)e(g_t^\tau, t) = 1$. □

3.2 Security Analysis of the Simultaneous Triple Pairing Assumption

To gain confidence in the simultaneous triple pairing assumption, we will explore its relationship with other cryptographic assumptions. First, we will show that the simultaneous triple pairing assumption follows from a computational hardness assumption called the simultaneous pairing assumption introduced by Groth and Lu [GL07]. Groth and Lu proved that the simultaneous pairing assumption is secure in the generic group model and since the security reduction only uses generic group operations this implies that the simultaneous triple pairing assumption is secure in the generic group model.[2] Second, we will show that the simultaneous triple pairing assumption follows from the decision linear assumption [BBS04].

Relation to the simultaneous pairing assumption. The simultaneous pairing problem is given $g, g_1 = g^{x_1}, h_1 = g^{x_1^2}, \ldots, g_n = g^{x_n}, h_n = g^{x_n^2} \in G_1$ for random $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ find a non-trivial set of elements $\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \in G_2$ such that

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, \mu_i) = 1 \quad \wedge \quad \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, \mu_i) = 1.$$

Definition 10 (Simultaneous pairing assumption) *The simultaneous pairing assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$ if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have*

$$\Pr\Big[gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); x_1, \ldots, x_n \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; g \leftarrow G_1 \setminus \{1\};$$
$$g_1 = g^{x_1}, h_1 = g^{x_1^2}, \ldots, g_1 = g^{x_n}, h_n = g^{x_n^2}; (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, g_1, h_1, \ldots, g_n, h_n) :$$
$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, \mu_i) = 1 \ \wedge \ \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, \mu_i) = 1 \ \wedge \ \exists i : \mu_i \neq 1\Big] \approx 0.$$

Theorem 11 *If the simultaneous pairing assumption with $n = 3$ holds for $\mathcal{G}$, then the simultaneous triple pairing assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$.*

Proof. Suppose we have an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that breaks the simultaneous triple pairing assumption with probability $\epsilon(k)$. We will show how to construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the simultaneous pairing assumption for $n = 3$ with probability higher than $\epsilon(k) - 6/p$.

Given a random simultaneous pairing problem instance $(gk, g_1, h_1, g_2, h_2, g_3, h_3)$ the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ picks at random $\rho, \sigma, \tau \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and computes

$$g_r = g_1^{\rho} \qquad h_r = h_1^{\rho} \qquad g_s = g_2^{\sigma} \qquad h_s = h_2^{\sigma} \qquad g_t = g_3^{\tau} \qquad h_t = h_3^{\tau}.$$

If $g_1 = 1, g_2 = 1$ or $g_3 = 1$ it is trivial to solve the simultaneous pairing problem. Provided the discrete logarithms of g_1, g_2, g_3 are non-trivial, *i.e.*, $x_1 \neq 1, x_2 \neq 1, x_3 \neq 1$, we get a random distribution of 6 group elements in $G \setminus \{1\}$, which has statistical distance less than $6/p$ from a random six-tuple of group elements in G_1. The adversary now runs $\mathcal{A}$ on $(gk, g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_t, h_t)$ and gets an non-trivial simultaneous triple pairing solution (r, s, t) with probability higher than $\epsilon(k) - 6/p$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s)e(g_t, t) &= e(g_1, r^{\rho})e(g_2, s^{\sigma})e(g_3, t^{\tau}) = 1 \\ e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s)e(h_t, t) &= e(h_1, r^{\rho})e(h_2, s^{\sigma})e(h_3, t^{\tau}) = 1, \end{aligned}$$

[2] Groth and Lu [GL07] introduced the simultaneous pairing assumption in the setting, where $G_1 = G_2$. We adapt it in a straightforward way to the more general case, where G_1 and G_2 may be two different groups. The generic group security in the setting $G_1 = G_2$ implies generic group security in the setting where G_1 and G_2 may be different.

so $(r^\rho, s^\sigma, t^\tau)$ is a non-trivial solution to the simultaneous pairing problem. $\square$

RELATION TO THE DECISION LINEAR ASSUMPTION. The decision linear problem is to decide whether a tuple $(g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^\rho, g_2^\sigma, g_3^\tau)$ has $\tau = \rho + \sigma$ or τ is random.

Definition 12 (Decision linear assumption) *The decision linear assumption holds in G_1 for $\mathcal{G}$ if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:*

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr\Big[gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k)\ ;\ g_1, g_2, g_3 \leftarrow G_1;\ \rho, \sigma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\ :\\ & \qquad\qquad \mathcal{A}(gk, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^\rho, g_2^\sigma, g_3^{\rho+\sigma}) = 1\Big] \\ \approx\ & \Pr\Big[gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k)\ ;\ g_1, g_2, g_3 \leftarrow G_1;\ \rho, \sigma, \tau \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\ :\\ & \qquad\qquad \mathcal{A}(gk, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^\rho, g_2^\sigma, g_3^\tau) = 1\Big]. \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 13 *The simultaneous triple pairing assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$, if the decision linear assumption holds in G_1 for $\mathcal{G}$.*

Proof. We will show how to convert an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that breaks the simultaneous triple pairing assumption with probability $\epsilon(k)$ into an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the decision linear assumption with more than $\epsilon(k) - 9/p$ chance.

On a decision linear challenge $(gk, g_1, g_2, g_3, h_1, h_2, h_3)$, $\mathcal{B}$ picks $\alpha, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ at random, sets

$$g_r = g_1\ ,\ h_r = h_1\ ,\ g_s = g_2\ ,\ h_s = h_2\ ,\ g_t = g_3^2 g_1^\alpha g_2^\beta\ ,\ h_t = h_3 h_1^\alpha h_2^\beta$$

and runs $(r, s, t) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_t, h_t)$. $\mathcal{B}$ returns 1 if r, s, t is a non-trivial solution to

$$\begin{aligned} e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s)e(g_t, t) = 1 \quad &\wedge \quad e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s)e(h_t, t) \\ e(g_1, rt^\alpha)e(g_3, t) = 1 \quad &\wedge \quad e(g_2, rt^\beta)e(g_3, t) = 1, \end{aligned}$$

and else it returns 0.

Let us now analyze the success probability of $\mathcal{B}$. It is given a challenge $(gk, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^\rho, g_2^\sigma, g_3^\tau)$, where $\tau = \rho + \sigma$ or τ is random. If $e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s)e(g_t, t) = 1 \ \wedge\ e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s)e(h_t, t) = 1$ we get

$$\begin{aligned} & \Big(e(g_1, rt^\alpha)e(g_3, t)\Big)\Big(e(g_2, st^\beta)e(g_3, t)\Big) = 1 \\ \wedge \quad & \Big(e(g_1, rt^\alpha)e(g_3, t)\Big)^\rho \Big(e(g_2, st^\beta)e(g_3, t)\Big)^\sigma = e(g_3, t^{\rho+\sigma-\tau}). \end{aligned}$$

In case $\tau = \rho + \sigma$, there is more than $\epsilon(k) - 4/p$ chance of outputting 1. To see this, observe that $g_1 \neq 1, g_2 \neq 1, g_3 \neq 1, \rho \neq \sigma$ gives a random simultaneous triple challenge with these restrictions. Since the probability of this condition failing is less than $4/p$ on a random simultaneous triple challenge we get more than $\epsilon(k) - 4/p$ chance of $\mathcal{A}$ outputting a non-trivial solution r, s, t. With $\rho \neq \sigma$ and $\tau = \rho + \sigma$, the two equalities above tell us that $e(g_1, rt^\alpha)e(g_3, t) = 1$ and $e(g_2, st^\beta)e(g_3, t) = 1$. We conclude that when $\tau = \rho + \sigma$ we get a probability of more than $\epsilon(k) - 4/p$ of outputting 1.

Suppose now τ is picked at random. If $g_1 \neq 1, g_2 \neq 1, g_3 \neq 1, \rho \neq \sigma, \tau \neq \rho + \sigma$ a solution r, s, t with $e(g_1, rt^\alpha)e(g_3, t) = 1$ and $e(g_2, st^\beta)e(g_3, t) = 1$ would imply $t = 1$. This in turn implies $r = 1$ and $s = 1$, leading us to conclude that r, s, t is trivial. Since the chance of $g_1 = 1 \vee g_2 = 1 \vee g_3 = 1 \vee \rho = \sigma \vee \tau = \rho + \sigma$ is less than $5/p$, there is less than $5/p$ chance of outputting 1, when τ is chosen at random. $\square$

4 Homomorphic Trapdoor Commitments to Group Elements

We will now present the homomorphic trapdoor commitment schemes. The setup algorithm generates a bilinear group (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e). The commitment schemes permits committing to n group elements from G_2.

4.1 Commitments based on the Double Pairing Assumption

We have message space $\mathcal{M}_{ck} = G_2^n$, randomizer space $\mathcal{R}_{ck} = G_2$ and commitment space $\mathcal{C}_{ck} = G_T$, where each of them are interpreted as a group using entry-wise multiplication.

Setup: On input 1^k return $gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k)$.

Key generator: On input gk pick at random $g_r \leftarrow G_1 \setminus \{1\}$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and define $g_1 = g_r^{x_1}, \cdots, g_n = g_r^{x_n}$. The commitment key is $ck = (gk, g_r, g_1, \ldots, g_n)$ and the trapdoor key is $tk = (gk, x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

Commitment: Using commitment key ck on input message $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in G_2^n$ pick randomizer $r \leftarrow G_2$. The commitment is given by

$$c = e(g_r, r) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i).$$

Trapdoor commitment: Using commitment key ck and trapdoor key tk generate an equivocal commitment $c \in G_T$ by picking $r \leftarrow G_2$ and computing $c = e(g_r, r)$ The corresponding equivocation key is $ek = (tk, r)$.

Trapdoor opening: On an equivocal commitment $c \in G_T$ to a message $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in G_2^n$ using the equivocation key ek, compute and return the trapdoor opening $r' = r \prod_{i=1}^{n} m_i^{-x_i}$.

Theorem 14 $(\mathcal{G}, K, \mathrm{com}, \mathrm{Tcom}, \mathrm{Topen})$ *described above is a homomorphic trapdoor commitment scheme to n group elements. It is perfectly trapdoor and assuming the double pairing assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$ the commitment scheme is computationally binding.*

Proof. Let us first prove the commitment scheme is homomorphic. The message space is G_2^n, the randomizer space is G_2 and the commitment space is G_T, which with entry-wise multiplication all are finite abelian groups. Given a commitment key $ck = (gk, g_r, g_1, \ldots, g_n)$ it is straightforward to check the homomorphic property. For all $(m_1, \ldots, m_n), (m'_1, \ldots, m'_n) \in G_2^n$ and all $r, r' \in G_2$ we have

$$e(g_r, r) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i) \cdot e(g_r, r') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m'_i) = e(g_r, rr') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i m'_i).$$

Next, we will prove that the commitment scheme has the perfect trapdoor property. By construction, $g_r \neq 1$ so both real commitments and trapdoor commitments are distributed uniformly at random in G_T, because of their $e(g_r, r)$ factor where r is chosen randomly from G_2. The fact that $g_r \neq 1$ also implies that for any commitment c and set of messages $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in G_2^n$ there is a unique randomizer $r \in G_2$ so $c = e(g_r, r) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i)$. To conclude the proof for the perfect trapdoor property, we therefore just need to show that the trapdoor opening algorithm gives the correct opening r' of the commitment. This follows from

$$e(g_r, r') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i) = e(g_r, r \prod_{i=1}^{n} m_i^{-x_i}) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_r^{x_i}, m_i) = e(g_r, r) = c.$$

Finally, we will prove that the commitment scheme is computationally binding if the double pairing assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$. More precisely, we will show that if $\mathcal{A}$ has probability $\epsilon(k)$ of breaking the binding property, then there is an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the double pairing assumption with at least $\epsilon(k) - 4/p$ chance.

Let (gk, g_r, g_t) be a random double pairing challenge given to $\mathcal{B}$. If $g_r \neq 1, g_t \neq 1$ it selects $\rho_1, \tau_1, \ldots, \rho_n, \tau_n \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $g_1 = g_r^{\rho_1} g_t^{\tau_1}, \ldots, g_n = g_r^{\rho_n} g_t^{\tau_n}$. It runs $\mathcal{A}$ on $(ck, g_r, g_1, \ldots, g_n)$ and with more than $\epsilon(k) - 1/p$ probability it gets two different openings to the same commitment. If the openings are $m_1, \ldots, m_n, r$ and $m'_1, \ldots, m'_n, r'$, we have by the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme that $e(g_r, r^{-1}r') \prod_{i=1}^n e(g_i, m_i^{-1} m'_i) = 1$. Defining $\mu_1 = m_1^{-1} m'_1, \ldots, \mu_n = m_n^{-1} m'_n$ this means we have $e(g_r, r^{-1}r') \prod_{i=1}^n e(g_i, \mu_i)$ where at least one $\mu_i \neq 1$. This implies

$$e(g_r, r^{-1}r') \prod_{i=1}^n e(g_r^{\rho_i} g_t^{\tau_i}, \mu_i) = e(g_r, r^{-1}r' \prod_{i=1}^n \mu_i^{\rho_i}) e(g_t, \prod_{i=1}^n \mu_i^{\tau_i}) = 1.$$

This breaks the double pairing assumption unless $r^{-1}r' \prod_{i=1}^n \mu_i^{\rho_i} = 1$ and $\prod_{i=1}^n \mu_i^{\tau_i} = 1$ at the same time. However, since the ρ_i's are perfectly hidden by the τ_i's, we have no more than $1/p$ chance of the latter equality holding when there is some $\mu_i \neq 1$.

There is less than $2/p$ chance of $g_r = 1$ or $g_t = 1$. If $g_r \neq 1$ and $g_t \neq 1$ we have at least $\epsilon(k) - 2/p$ chance of breaking the double pairing assumption. We conclude that $\mathcal{B}$ has more than $\epsilon(k) - 4/p$ chance of breaking the double pairing assumption. □

4.2 Commitments based on the Simultaneous Triple Pairing Assumption

We have message space $\mathcal{M}_{ck} = G_2^n$, randomizer space $\mathcal{R}_{ck} = G_2^2$ and commitment space $\mathcal{C}_{ck} = G_T^2$, where each of them are interpreted as a group using entry-wise multiplication.

Setup: On input 1^k return $gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k)$.

Key generator: On input gk pick at random $g \leftarrow G_1 \setminus \{1\}$ and $x_r, y_r, x_s, y_s, x_1, y_1, \ldots, x_n, y_n \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $x_r y_s \neq x_s y_r$ and define

$$g_r = g^{x_r} \quad h_r = g^{y_r} \quad g_s = g^{x_s} \quad h_s = g^{y_s} \quad g_1 = g^{x_1} \quad h_1 = g^{y_1} \cdots g_n = g^{x_n} \quad h_n = g^{y_n}.$$

The commitment key is $ck = (gk, g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_1, h_1, \ldots, g_n, h_n)$ and the trapdoor key is $tk = (gk, g, x_r, x_s, y_r, y_s, x_1, y_1, \ldots, x_n, y_n)$.

Commitment: Using commitment key ck on input message $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in G_2^n$ pick randomizer $(r, s) \leftarrow G_2^2$. The commitment is $(c, d) \in G_T^2$ given by

$$c = e(g_r, r) e(g_s, s) \prod_{i=1}^n e(g_i, m_i) \quad \wedge \quad d = e(h_r, r) e(h_s, s) \prod_{i=1}^n e(h_i, m_i).$$

Trapdoor commitment: Using commitment key ck and trapdoor key tk, generate an equivocal commitment $(c, d) \in G_T^2$ by picking $(r, s) \leftarrow G_2^2$ and computing

$$c = e(g_r, r) e(g_s, s) \quad \text{and} \quad d = e(h_r, r) e(h_s, s).$$

The corresponding equivocation key is $ek = (tk, r, s)$.

Trapdoor opening: To trapdoor open an equivocal commitment $(c, d) \in G_T^2$ to a message $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in G_2^n$ using the equivocation key ek, compute

$$a = r^{x_r} s^{x_s} \prod_{i=1}^{n} m_i^{-x_i} \quad \text{and} \quad b = r^{y_r} s^{y_s} \prod_{i=1}^{n} m_i^{-y_i}.$$

Since $x_r y_s \neq x_s y_r$ we can compute

$$\begin{pmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} x_r & x_s \\ y_r & y_s \end{pmatrix}^{-1}.$$

Compute

$$r' = a^{\alpha} b^{\beta} \quad \text{and} \quad s' = a^{\gamma} b^{\delta}.$$

Return the opening (r', s') of (c, d) to message $(m_1, \ldots, m_n)$.

Theorem 15 $(\mathcal{G}, K, \text{com}, \text{Tcom}, \text{Topen})$ *described above is a homomorphic trapdoor commitment scheme to n group elements. It has the perfect trapdoor property and assuming the simultaneous triple pairing assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$ the commitment scheme is computationally binding.*

Proof. Let us first prove the commitment scheme is homomorphic. The message space is G_2^n, the randomizer space is G_2^2 and the commitment space is G_T^2, which with entry-wise multiplication all are finite abelian groups. Given a commitment key $ck = (gk, g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_1, h_1, \ldots, g_n, h_n)$ it is straightforward to check the homomorphic property. For all $(m_1, \ldots, m_n), (m'_1, \ldots, m'_n) \in G_2^n$ and all $(r, s), (r', s') \in G_2^2$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i) \cdot e(g_r, r')e(g_s, s') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m'_i) &= e(g_r, rr')e(g_s, ss') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i m'_i) \\ e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, m_i) \cdot e(h_r, r')e(h_s, s') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, m'_i) &= e(h_r, rr')e(h_s, ss') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, m_i m'_i) \end{aligned}$$

Next, we will prove that the commitment scheme has the perfect trapdoor property. By construction, $x_r y_s \neq x_s y_r$ so (x_r, y_r) and (x_s, y_s) are linearly independent in $\mathbb{Z}_p^2$. We can deduce from this that both real commitments and trapdoor commitments are distributed uniformly at random in G_T^2, because of their $e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s)$ and $e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s)$ factors where r, s are chosen randomly from G_2. The linear independence of (x_r, y_r) and (x_s, y_s) also implies that for any pair $(c, d) \in G_T^2$ and a set of messages $(m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in G_2^n$ there is a unique randomizer $(r, s) \in G_2^2$ so

$$c = e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i) \quad \wedge \quad d = e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, m_i).$$

To conclude the proof for the perfect trapdoor property, we therefore just need to show that the trapdoor opening algorithm gives the correct opening (r', s') of the commitment. Since

$$\begin{pmatrix} x_r & x_s \\ y_r & y_s \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \alpha & \beta \\ \gamma & \delta \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix},$$

we have

$$\begin{aligned} e(g_r, r')e(g_s, s') &= e(g^{x_r}, a^{\alpha} b^{\beta})e(g^{x_s}, a^{\gamma} b^{\delta}) = e(g, a^{x_r \alpha + x_s \gamma})e(g, b^{x_r \beta + x_s \delta}) = e(g, a) \\ e(h_r, r')e(h_s, s') &= e(g^{y_r}, a^{\alpha} b^{\beta})e(g^{y_s}, a^{\gamma} b^{\delta}) = e(g, a^{y_r \alpha + y_s \gamma})e(g, b^{y_r \beta + y_s \delta}) = e(g, b). \end{aligned}$$

By plugging in $a = r^{x_r} s^{x_s} \prod_{i=1}^{n} m_i^{-x_i}$ and $b = r^{y_r} s^{y_s} \prod_{i=1}^{n} m_i^{-y_i}$ we get

$$\begin{aligned} e(g_r, r')e(g_s, s') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, m_i) &= e(g, r^{x_r} s^{x_s}) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g, m_i^{x_i - x_i}) = e(g_r, r)e(g_s, s) = c \\ e(h_r, r')e(h_s, s') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, m_i) &= e(g, r^{y_r} s^{y_s}) \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g, m_i^{y_i - y_i}) = e(h_r, r)e(h_s, s) = d, \end{aligned}$$

as we wanted.

Finally, we will prove that the commitment scheme is computationally binding if the simultaneous triple pairing assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$. More precisely, we will show that if $\mathcal{A}$ has probability $\epsilon(k)$ of breaking the binding property, then there is an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that breaks the simultaneous triple pairing assumption with at least $\epsilon(k) - 3/p$ chance.

Let $(gk, g_r, g_s, g_t, h_r, h_s, h_t)$ be a random simultaneous triple pairing challenge for $\mathcal{B}$. We pick at random $\rho_1, \sigma_1, \tau_1, \ldots, \rho_n, \sigma_n, \tau_n \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and define $g_1, h_1, \ldots, g_n, h_n$ by

$$g_i = g_r^{\rho_i} g_s^{\sigma_i} g_t^{\tau_i} \qquad h_i = h_r^{\rho_i} h_s^{\sigma_i} h_t^{\tau_i}.$$

If (x_r, y_r) and (x_s, y_s) are linearly independent in $\mathbb{Z}_p^2$ all these group elements are randomly distributed in G_1. This means $ck = (gk, g_r, h_r, g_s, h_s, g_1, h_1, \ldots, g_n, h_n)$ has the same distribution as commitment keys generated by K.

$\mathcal{B}$ gives this ck to $\mathcal{A}$ and in case $x_r y_s \neq x_s y_r$ it has $\epsilon(k)$ probability of getting two different messages $(m_1, \ldots, m_n), (m'_1, \ldots, m'_n)$ and randomizers $(r, s), (r', s')$ so

$$\mathrm{com}_{ck}(m_1, \ldots, m_n; r, s) = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(m'_1, \ldots, m'_n; r', s').$$

Define $\mu_1 = m'_1 m_1^{-1}, \ldots, \mu_n = m'_n m_n^{-1}$ and $r'' = r' r^{-1}, s'' = s' s^{-1}$. By the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme we have $\mathrm{com}_{ck}(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n; r'', s'') = (1, 1)$. This gives us

$$\begin{aligned} e(g_r, r'')e(g_s, s'') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(g_i, \mu_i) = e(g_r, r'' \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\rho_i}) e(g_s, s'' \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\sigma_i}) e(g_t, \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\tau_i}) &= 1 \\ e(h_r, r'')e(h_s, s'') \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(h_i, \mu_i) = e(h_r, r'' \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\rho_i}) e(h_s, s'' \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\sigma_i}) e(h_t, \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\tau_i}) &= 1. \end{aligned}$$

Since $(m_1, \ldots, m_n)$ and $(m'_1, \ldots, m'_n)$ are different, there is at least one $\mu_i \neq 1$. Recall $g_i = g_r^{\rho_i} g_s^{\sigma_i} g_t^{\tau_i}$ and $h_i = h_r^{\rho_i} h_s^{\sigma_i} h_t^{\tau_i}$ for random $\rho_i, \sigma_i, \tau_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. With (x_r, y_r) and (x_s, y_s) linearly independent in $\mathbb{Z}_p^2$ there is for any τ'_i a unique pair $(\rho'_i, \sigma'_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ that would yield g_i, h_i. This means from $\mathcal{A}$'s perspective τ_i is a perfectly hidden random value in $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The probability that $\prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\tau_i} = 1$ is therefore at most $1/p$.

Conditioned on $x_r y_s \neq x_s y_r$ the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ breaks the simultaneous triple pairing problem with probability $\epsilon(k) - 1/p$. There is less than $2/p$ chance for the discrete logarithms satisfying $x_r y_s = x_s y_r$. We conclude that $\mathcal{B}$ has more than $\epsilon(k) - 3/p$ chance of $(r'' \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\rho_i}, s'' \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\sigma_i}, \prod_{i=1}^{n} \mu_i^{\tau_i})$ being a non-trivial solution to the simultaneous triple pairing problem. □

5 Committing to Commitments

Recall the Pedersen commitment to multiple elements from $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The public key consists of $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m, h$ and we commit to $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ by computing $c = h^t \prod_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_i^{x_i}$ for $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. The Pedersen commitment is a homomorphic perfectly hiding trapdoor commitment. It is computationally binding assuming the discrete logarithm problem is hard.

Since Pedersen commitments are group elements, we can use the commitment schemes from this paper to commit to multiple Pedersen commitments. More precisely, we can set up the Pedersen commitments in G_2 and now use our commitment scheme to commit to n Pedersen commitments at once. Since each Pedersen commitment can hold m elements from $\mathbb{Z}_p$, this means we have a commitment to mn elements from $\mathbb{Z}_p$ using this technique. The public key size is $O(m+n)$ group elements, so unlike the Pedersen commitment scheme by itself this combined commitment scheme has a sub-linear size commitment key.

Since our commitment scheme is homomorphic with respect to the Pedersen commitments in G_2 and the Pedersen commitments are homomorphic with respect to the field elements in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, the combined commitment scheme is homomorphic with respect to the field elements in $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Moreover, since the Pedersen commitment scheme is a perfectly hiding trapdoor commitment scheme, our combined commitment scheme is also a perfectly hiding trapdoor commitment scheme. The binding property relies on the discrete logarithm assumption in G_2 and either the double pairing assumption or the simultaneous triple pairing assumption in G_1.

5.1 Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge Argument of Knowledge for the Combined Commitment Scheme

While reducing the key size for homomorphic commitments is interesting in its own right, another concern that comes up in practice is that the opening of the commitment is large. We will now show that the combined commitment schemes have efficient 3-move honest verifier zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge, which in some applications means that we do not have to reveal the entire opening. This stands in contrast to the standard Pedersen commitment to multiple messages, where all known practical zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge have a size that grows linearly in the number of field elements we have committed to. It is possible to give similar types of efficient arguments for statements such as all the committed values being 0 or the committed values having a particular sum.

We will write ck for the commitment key for our commitment scheme, which can be either one of the two schemes we have proposed in the paper, and let $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m, h$ be the commitment key for the Pedersen commitment. The statement is a commitment $c \in \mathcal{C}_{ck}$ and the prover wants to give an argument of knowledge of the contents of c. The prover's private input consists of $r \in \mathcal{R}_{ck}$ and $t_1, \ldots, t_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $m_{11}, \ldots, m_{mn} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ so $c = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(c_1, \ldots, c_n; r)$, where $c_j = h^{t_j} \prod_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_i^{m_{ij}}$. The argument runs as follows.

1. The prover picks $t, d_1, \ldots, d_m \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $c_d = h^t \prod_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_i^{d_i}$. The prover also picks $t'_1, \ldots, t'_n$ and computes $c'_j = h^{t'_j}$. Finally, the prover picks $r' \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{ck}$ and computes $c' = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(c'_1, \ldots, c'_n; r')$. The prover sends (c_d, c') to the verifier.
2. The verifier sends the prover random challenges $e, e_1, \ldots, e_n \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$.
3. The prover answers with $r'' = r^e r', c''_1 = c_1^e c'_1, \ldots, c''_n = c_n^e c'_n$ and $t' = e \sum_{j=1}^{n} e_j t_j + \sum_{j=1}^{n} e_j t'_j + t, m_1 = d_1 + e \sum_{j=1}^{n} e_j m_{1j}, \ldots, m_m = d_m + e \sum_{j=1}^{n} e_j m_{mj}$.
4. The verifier accepts the argument if $c^e c' = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(c''_1, \ldots, c''_n; r'')$ and $c_d \prod_{j=1}^{n} (c''_j)^{e_j} = h^{t'} \prod_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_i^{m_i}$.

The complexity of this argument is roughly n or $2n$ pairings, $m+n$ exponentiations and mn multiplications for the prover, and n or $2n$ pairings and $n+m$ exponentiations for the verifier. The communication is roughly $2n+m$ group and field elements. In other words, it is in all aspects significantly shorter and faster than the process of committing, opening, and verifying the opening of the commitment.

Theorem 16 *The protocol is a 3-move honest verifier zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of the contents of the commitment c.*

Proof. The protocol clearly has 3 moves and it can be verified by inspection that the argument given above has perfect completeness.

We will now show that the protocol has perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge. By this we mean that given a challenge $e, e_1, \ldots, e_n$ it is possible to perfectly simulate the entire argument. The simulation works as follows, the simulator picks random commitments $c_1'', \ldots, c_n''$ and randomizer r'' and computes $c' = c^{-e}\mathrm{com}_{ck}(c_1'', \ldots, c_n''; r'')$. It also picks $m_1, \ldots, m_n$ and t' at random and computes $c_d = h^{t'} \prod_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_i^{m_i} \prod_{j=1}^{n} (c_j'')^{-e_j}$. The simulated argument is $(c_d, c', e, e_1, \ldots, e_n, r'', c_1'', \ldots, c_n'', t', m_1, \ldots, m_m)$.

To see this is a perfect simulation when the challenge is $e, e_1, \ldots, e_n$, observe that both in a real argument and in a simulated argument the values $r'', c_1'', \ldots, c_n''$ and $t', m_1, \ldots, m_m$ are uniformly random. Conditioned on these values, both c' and c_d can be determined uniquely. Real arguments and simulated arguments are therefore identically distributed.

Finally, we will show that the protocol is an argument of knowledge. Consider an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that has probability of $\epsilon(k)$ of making an acceptable argument, we will show that there is a black-box witness-extended emulator $\mathcal{B}$ that has success-probability $\epsilon(k)$ of answering a random challenge $e, e_1, \ldots, e_n$ and at the same time outputting an opening of the commitment.

$\mathcal{B}$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ on the random challenges $e, e_1, \ldots, e_n$. If $\mathcal{A}$ fails to produce an acceptable argument, we are done. However, with probability $\epsilon(k)$ it does produce an accepting argument on the challenge, and $\mathcal{B}$ needs to extract an opening of the commitment. $\mathcal{B}$ rewinds $\mathcal{A}$ to the point where it has sent the initial message and selects new random challenges $e, e_1, \ldots, e_n$ (it is possible, although unlikely, that the same challenge will repeat) until it has $2n+1$ acceptable arguments with the same initial message c_d, c'. Since $\mathcal{A}$ has probability $\epsilon(k)$ chance of making an accepting argument in the first place, and collecting $2n+1$ acceptable arguments will take an average of $\frac{2n+1}{\epsilon(k)}$ rewinds, we get that on average $\mathcal{B}$ uses $2n+1$ runs of $\mathcal{A}$.

Let us now look at accepting challenges collected by $\mathcal{B}$. Since $\mathcal{B}$ runs an expected $2n+1$ runs of $\mathcal{A}$, which is expected polynomial time, there is an overwhelming probability that two of the accepting argument use different e. Picking two different challenges $e \neq \hat{e}$ we get two equations $c^e c' = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(c_1'', \ldots, c_n''; r'')$ and $c^{\hat{e}} = \mathrm{com}_{ck}(\hat{c_1}'', \ldots, \hat{c_n}''; \hat{r}'')$. From this we can compute an opening of c and then compute an opening of c'. By the binding property of the commitment scheme, these openings will be used by $\mathcal{A}$ in all the accepting arguments when answering the challenges.

Consider now the second part of the verification. We have all the accepting arguments satisfy

$$c_d \prod_{j=1}^{n} (c_j'')^{e_j} = c_d \prod_{j=1}^{n} (c_j^e c_j')^{e_j} = c_d^1 \prod_{j=1}^{n} c_j^{ee_j} \prod_{j=1}^{n} (c_j')^{e_j} = h^{t'} \prod_{i=1}^{m} \gamma_i^{m_i}.$$

With overwhelming probability the $2n+1$ challenge vectors $(1, ee_1, \ldots, ee_n, e_1, \ldots, e_n)$ are linearly independent. The $2n+1$ equations given by the accepting arguments then make it possible to extract openings of all the commitments $c_1, \ldots, c_n$. We conclude that the is negligible probability for $\mathcal{A}$ making a valid argument, yet $\mathcal{B}$ not being able to extract an opening of c. □

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